Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz - Poland’s raison d’�tat and the New International Environment

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz - Poland’s raison d’�tat and the New International Environment

The contemporary world has entered a stage of far-reaching changes, where processes transforming global and regional alignments unfold at a rapid pace. These processes largely concern globalisation and fragmentation; new threats to security, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; modernisation challenges faced by many societies; and widening development gap between rich and poor. Poland is directly affected by these developments. They have to be identified and interpreted in accordance with its vital national interests, with its raison d’�tat.

We now have to define our interests in an environment that is subject to abrupt and sweeping change. The challenge today is to take timely decisions with long-range consequences and a tall price for the error of omission. One example is the question of our involvement in the Iraqi operation. Polish leaders faced a major dilemma, fully aware of the public mood at home and deep divisions among Poland’s closest allies and partners. Yet they took a risky decision, vindicated in moral and political terms by subsequent developments.

Poland’s involvement in Iraq has so far served well our national interests. The country’s prestige has been enhanced, and our position within the allied community has been upgraded. Assuming the task of administration of a stabilisation zone in Iraq is another major chance for Poland in building its standing in the world and the region.

Poland’s accession to the EU also exerts an important influence upon the way our interests are identified. Just as membership of NATO has added allied solidarity in security matters to our raison d’�tat thinking, so the entry into the EU will merge our raison d’�tat with Europe’s collective political and economic interests. This calls for a moment of reflection about our position, and a re-interpretation of our interests.

In a way, the EU accession has exhausted Poland’s foreign policy agenda so far, whose principal goals provided for rebuilding sovereignty, ensuring security through NATO, and guaranteeing growth and welfare via membership of the European Union. These tasks represented major foreign policy guidelines of all seccessive governments of the democratic Poland, determining its sustained and non-partisan character, and helping to resolve dilemmas that could emerge along the way. But today’s challenges are of a different kind. We have to respond to new questions, among them: what sort of a European Union we have in mind, what place we would hope to occupy there, what shape should be taken by the North Atlantic community and what role we would like to play therein, what identity within an expanding Europe should be retained by the continent’s central and eastern part, or what contribution could Poland make to the global policy? The decisions taken today may determine the profile of our involvement for years to come.

National Interests

Poland’s basic interests remain unchanged. They concern the protection of sovereignty and independence, inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. The Polish raison d’�tat is to ensure the protection and security of citizens, guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental liberties, safeguard the democratic order, create conditions for the country’s civilisational and economic development and prosperity of its residents, and preserve the national heritage and identity.

The conditions for the pursuit of these goals are favourable indeed. Rarely in our history have we had so many external determinants conducive to our aspirations. The past decade was a propitious time for Poland on the international stage. Following decisions taken at the Prague and Copenhagen summits, NATO and the European Union are expanding to embrace new members, thus removing the last vestiges of Europe’s Yalta divisions. New allies will soon appear on our borders, exerting favourable influence on regional stability. Transformation processes in the region have been developing steadfastly. Despite fears of resulting occasional political, social and ethnic tensions, there is no reason to assume that these processes might seriously compromise the security system in the region, including in this country.

Poland has to make up for much of the distance lost in the development field. The socio-economic gap between us and the affluent countries of Europe remains considerable. And the challenges we face have been magnified by a slump in international economic trends over the past years. The membership of the European Union opens before us a historic chance for a civilisation leap. Staying outside the Union, we would have to take on the same modernisation challenges, only on much worse terms.

Top Priority: Accession to EU

The Polish raison d’�tat requires that the country’s entry into the European Union be regarded as a task of historic importance.

Poland’s EU membership will pose a challenge that is not confined to its domestic consequences alone: completion of the adjustment process, implementation of the various policies, or budgetary requirements. While both legally and formally we will, of course, be a member state on a par with other EU members, we must not forget that under the Treaty of Nice we will have a considerable say in the European Council. Poland will be among the six largest European countries. Thanks to the position arduously built in the region since the early 1990s and owing to harmonious co-operation within the Visegrad Group, we are entering the Union with a group of friendly countries we are linked with not only by history, but by many common interests as well. Consequently, together with our three closest European partners and neighbours, Poland will command the same number of votes in the European Union as France and Germany. This fact illustrates the extent of future changes in various countries’ influences, as measured by vote weighting in the Council. And although our real position will depend primarily on our capacity to meet membership obligations, on our ability to tap all the opportunities offered by membership and on our own activity, there can be no questioning Poland’s enormous responsibility for the future of our continent.

The enlargement of the European Union to accommodate ten new members is just another step on the road to a common Europe, to be based on universally shared values and striving to ensure the sources of wellbeing to all its people. From this perspective Poland perceives the need for developing the Union’s eastern dimension, so as to provide a reinforced platform for co-operation with East European countries. It should embrace both the countries with strong European aspirations, such as Ukraine and Moldova, and those that do not seek integration and yet constitute an important part of this continent. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, therefore, developed a concept of the EU’s future eastern policy, which we would like to see pursued following the enlargement. This is a genuine Polish concept, stemming from the experiences gained in continuous contacts with our eastern neighbours. The Polish raison d’�tat makes it imperative to tighten up these neighbours’ European affinities, support their European aspirations and prevent divisions in our part of Europe. Perhaps time has come to ponder the question of possible closer political integration between countries in Eastern Europe and the European Union.

Aware of the responsibility that comes with EU membership, Poland intends to commit itself in all fields of the EU’s external relations. And although the member states obviously focus on countries next door, it would not serve the goal of cohesion if EU foreign policy lines and dimensions were to be identified with any particular groups of member states. Consequently, Poland has been contributing to the stabilisation process in the Western Balkans and takes interest in joining the Barcelona process as well as the EU’s Middle East policy.

When reflecting on the importance of our membership of the European Union, we should bear it in mind that the Union is not given once and for all. It remains a living, dynamic organism, and its face is going to change with our entry.

The sense of European unity and the bonds linking people have grown so strong that the need arose at the threshold of the 21st century to draw up a constitutional treaty specifying not just the rights of the EU member states, but also of its citizens. The institutional arrangements jointly developed—especially with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy—will be of major importance for the future of Europe. As the experience of the past months indicates, lasting success in developing a common European policy is not yet a foregone conclusion. We all have to draw constructive conclusions from that. All countries in the Union have to take part—on an equal footing—in an intense dialogue on the subject, thus providing a basis for common policy. The institutional arrangements, for instance relating to the office of Europe’s common “foreign minister,” will greatly influence the way in which new areas of common policy will be developing. While they are introduced, the principles of democracy in relations between EU-constituting entities must be observed. But the most important question is about fostering political will among European countries, especially the largest ones, to develop a common policy based on the highest possible common denominator.

European security policy can only be developed on a solid foundation of transatlantic co-operation, whose tested framework is offered by NATO. Europe and the United States are linked by shared common values, common experiences and above all by common interests. Founded on the experiences of many generations, these relations must be developed in a manner consistent with the need to ensure a sense of stability and security for the future generations as well. Co-operation with the United States within the North Atlantic Alliance remains the quintessence of European security. The consolidation of the transatlantic bonds stems directly from the Polish raison d’�tat. This is so because a security formula that links our closest partners and neighbours—and especially such strategic partners as the US and Germany, France and the United Kingdom—lies in our interest. Our current diplomatic activity specifically seeks to revive the spirit of transatlantic solidarity.

The development of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy should be subordinated to the consolidation of this formula. Attempts seeking to lay down foundations of European security in opposition to the US or designs that might result in the weakening of the US role in the international security system should be regarded counter-productive, yielding results diametrically different than intended. The European security identity should be fostered, but this must be a natural organic process, open to all states in the Union.

With the EU about to be enlarged to include twenty-odd member states—25, and in a matter of several years perhaps 27 or 28—the idea of the so-called enhanced co-operation and its development into new forms has been increasingly reappearing in European discussions. But a strong asset of the European Union is its flexibility, making it possible to develop arrangements acceptable to all member states and to carry out projects consistent with their level of economic development, social situation and cultural heritage. Today, the members of the European Communities and the European Union of long standing, the economic leaders, are interested in reaffirming their right to develop new enhanced-co-operation projects without concern for those lagging behind. This could be seen in the course of work on the constitutional treaty. Such solutions, however, carry the threat of appearance or implementation of old-time concepts known as “hardcore and hinterland” or “concentric circles of European integration.” If implemented, such concepts would put the acceding countries, including Poland, in an unfavourable position, evoking among them a sense of second-category membership, with no chance of reaching full integration. Nonetheless we must bear it in mind that no one and nothing may even think of preventing such forms of co-operation between states as meet their interests and their will. For this reason, the European states will have to make a practical choice: either to give their consent to enhanced co-operation within a common Europe, i.e. the European Union, or to accept new mechanisms of co-operation outside EU structures sponsored by the most interested countries. From Poland’s viewpoint as well as that of European unity, the latter arrangement should be opposed, for it tends to play down the relative importance of integration. It would, therefore, be in the interest of all European states for concrete, easy-to-define criteria to be identified in order to regulate the pursuit of enhanced co-operation. Openness and transparency of new mechanisms and new projects should be the most important of these criteria.

New Threats, New Challenges

The direction of change in the European security environment is a positive one. As a result, the international environment in Poland’s immediate vicinity is becoming increasingly secure, which contributes to the creation of conditions conducive to the development of our country.

Poland’s security, however, is increasingly affected by the consequences of the processes of globalisation and fragmentation, which determine evolution of the contemporary world. The challenges to security are primarily linked to a weakening regulatory capacity of states and international organisations, a growing polarisation between the rich and the poor (in terms of development levels and standards of living), and the frustration and social unrest that feed on it. Underdevelopment, poverty, environmental degradation, dangerous diseases, uncontrolled migrations and ethnic tensions have been undermining international stability ever more perceptibly.

The essence of evolution of our security environment is that the centre of gravity has been shifting away from conventional threats (armed invasion) towards non-conventional ones, generated by hard-to-identify non-state actors. Affecting the security of our citizens, facilities and services of importance for effective state functioning, these new threats call for special attention on our part. However, monitoring the situation for a possible revival of traditional perils continues to be an important task, too.

The greatest threat posed to the international system and to the security of individual states, Poland included, is organised international terrorism—a fact which was brought home to us so painfully by the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Its targets are values, institutions and interests of states in the Euro-Atlantic area. But the degree of the terrorist menace to individual states is not identical. The principal threat to individual states, whole regions and, in certain circumstances, to the global system comes from the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery. Programmes designed to develop WMD potential and missile systems are still pursued by several countries. When completed, Polish territory may well come in several years’ time within the range of ballistic missiles from outside Europe. This threat is compounded by the fact that this kind of weaponry and its carriers may fall into the hands of terrorist and criminal organisations.

Another threat to Poland’s security comes from international organised crime, due both to what it deals with (trafficking in arms, dangerous materials, people and drugs) and how it deals with it (corruption, money laundering, financial destabilisation). Poland has been attracting growing interest from organised international criminal groups due to its position as a transit country. IT-related threats have also become increasingly plausible.

In the long run, a state’s security is contingent on its capacity to cope with economic, environmental and demographic challenges that are of such complex dimensions as to demand something more than the traditional security strategy tools.

Thus, a challenge for Poland is to ensure such modernisation processes, including the structure of foreign investments, which will guarantee economic stability, sustainable development and stronger links with the world’s centres of technological and scientific progress. Another major task is to assure energy security, including diversified supplies of oil and natural gas. And an increasing challenge for Poland, as an integral part of the West, may prove to be mass migration from poor, less developed countries, migration rooted in conflicts, political persecution, failed states or environmental degradation taking place there.

The changes taking place in Poland’s international security environment call for a more profound reflection on our policy. Its effect will be a new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.

One of its basic premises is that the difference between external and internal security aspects is ever more blurred today. At the same time, gaining in importance is the international factor as well as the role of international co-operation, especially within allied structures. The weight of non-military factors—economic, social and environmental—has been on the rise. Greatly influencing the level of international security is respect for universal human rights, the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Poland has, therefore, been seeking to strengthen the role of international law and multilateral institutions. The effectiveness of international institutions and their capacity to take on new challenges will favourably influence our own security. Hence it is crucial for this country’s security that the North Atlantic Alliance adapt to discharge out of area duties stemming from the need of commitment to the cause of global stability, while keeping at the same time its classic defence functions.

For Poland, NATO remains the key framework of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in security and defence, and the main pillar of politico-military stability on the continent. At the same time, Poland supports the Alliance’s evolution towards new missions and capabilities, while retaining a credible potential and capacity to perform the classic functions of collective defence. Preservation of these capabilities provides a guarantee of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and a safeguard against a possible return of direct military threats to Poland. Together with other allies, this country will take active part in combating international terrorism and other new threats. NATO must acquire and develop its capabilities in regard to crisis response, civil planning, prevention and combating asymmetric attacks.

We are in favour of NATO’s selective globalisation. It is an important way of strengthening mutual bonds and awareness of mutual benefits from co-operation between Europe and America. Its practical expression is provided by NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. Poland recognises positive chances for working out a formula of a more mature North Atlantic partnership. It is likely that a conceptual reflection, similar to the one that provoked the famous 1967 Harmel Report, would once again prove useful.

An important element in the evolution of the European security system is NATO’s deepened partnership with Russia. Poland will take practical steps towards its development, seeking the implementation of provisions of the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. This NATO-Russia co-operation should contribute to its greater involvement in Euro-Atlantic collaboration, without exerting adverse influence upon NATO’s effectiveness and its internal decision-making. Poland will support Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including through continuation of the policy of “open door” to NATO. This co-operation should help to consolidate Ukraine’s meaningful role in the European security and integration policy. This country is also in favour of strengthening the role played by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace in regard to security for Southeast Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Poland also lends its support to developing NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative.

As a member of NATO and the EU, Poland will support the building of the Union’s military capabilities (armed forces) playing the function of NATO’s European pillar and relying on Alliance resources. Poland considers that the EU’s efforts with regard to operational capabilities and NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative should mutually complement and strengthen each other. As a member of both organisations, Poland finds it desirable that a continuous and institutionalised co-operation develop between these two structures so as to ensure full complementarity of EU and NATO activities.

Polish Initiative of a New Political Act for the United Nations

The international relations in the first half of 2003 were to a large extent affected by the Iraqi crisis, which also highlighted the need for a deeper reflection on the functioning of the UN mechanism as well as the effectiveness of the instruments of international law. We may not acquiesce in a situation where the Security Council’s decision-making paralysis is perceived as a signal for marginalisation of the UN. The UN remains an important structure around which a new international order should be built. The challenge faced by the international community consists in adjusting the Organisation to the new tasks and conditions. Indeed, in many respects this body represents a reflection of a world that is receding into the past.

For many years now we could witness steady erosion of the United Nations, especially with regard to international security. There are two major sources of its weakness. First, the UN was founded 58 years ago as an Organisation of 51 members that perceived Germany and Japan as principal threats to international security. Today, the threats that determined the position of states at the time of founding the UN no longer exist, and the two countries in question have been making important contribution to building mechanisms of global co-operation and security. Opposition to their aspirations to permanent membership of the Security Council has been steadily waning. The international environment is threatened by phenomena of another kind, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as failed states and rogue states that resort to these instruments of threat and extortion. Secondly, over the years the UN membership has increased almost fourfold. At present a majority of the UN members are former colonies, which perceive their national interest primarily in settling scores with the former metropolies or in venting frustrations that stem from economic underdevelopment or inability to pursue political goals, based on a strong belief in their cultural superiority. This has lead to the emergence of a sui generis battle-front between the so-called rich North and poor South. The division line has largely run between the old and the new members, and its existence has often proved a major obstacle to the effective functioning of the UN.

Short-lived voting victories scored at the General Assembly (and sometimes the Security Council) and reflecting ideological or political expedience rooted in the meanders of individual countries’ short-term internal policies, have greatly contributed to the paralysis of the Organisation. It took a dozen years or so to understand that the system—even if providing a transient satisfaction to members of a voting majority—is ineffective, because non-binding in formal and legal terms resolutions failed to be implemented. This situation provokes many to question the sense of the UN’s further existence and call for change of the status quo. Indeed, change is the only way out for the Organisation, whose existence is indispensable for a proper and effective operation of the future global security system based on multilateral foundations. For a medium-sized country like Poland, the raison d’�tat dictates a commitment to strengthening the role of multilateral organisations and international law.

The past attempts at overhaul have helped the UN to stay in touch with the realities, but proved insufficient to make it capable of undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the dynamically changing international environment or effective enough to work out a vision of a new global order. The will to change manifested by the international community in the Millennium Declaration— strenuously and consistently implemented by Secretary-General Kofi Annan—is confined above all to the institution itself, the mechanisms of its functioning, finances and effectiveness. Poland is of the opinion that the pursuit of reforms would be facilitated by formulating a new political message that ought to become a basis for measures to be taken by the Organisation in a fast-evolving international environment at the threshold of the 21st century. The old road signs, set up back in 1945, may not prove sufficient any longer.

At the 57th General Assembly session, with a view to improving the system of international security and enhancing the role of the United Nation, I came forward with a proposal to work out a New Political Act for the United Nations at the threshold of the 21st century. Such a new “road map” for the international community confronted with new challenges, must be developed right now. As we see it, the UN is capable of acting as a guardian of international security (ensuring that human rights and security are strictly observed) provided we overcome conservatism and inertia on the part of bureaucratic structures as well as the reluctance on the part of many countries to change the status quo.

The initiative to work out a New Political Act for the United Nations at the dawn of the 21st century is of an open and long-term character. We do not propose to revise the UN Charter, a subject worked upon and debated for more than 25 years at various UN bodies and committees. What we propose is a different, new approach: we want a political document that would put the Charter in a new context, taking account of the changes underway in the international environment. But this initiative must not be viewed in a short-term political context, although developments are bound to influence its shape.

The aim of the document we propose is to complement the Charter’s provisions at the political level, given the present realities and the new challenges. Our intention is to make the Organisation’s operation easier in spheres not covered by the Charter. Let me reiterate: the Polish initiative is not an alternative to the UN’s ongoing work on functional reform of the Secretariat or processes to strengthen the UN system, reform the Security Council and revitalise the General Assembly.

The focus of our initiative is on the search for common ground, to be shared by all members of the international community, in approaching the key new developments that shape the international environment. We have to re-interpret the sense of such fundamental notions as state sovereignty and its limitations, the legitimacy of international actions (including intervention and use of force to resolve crises), security in its national and individual dimension, responsibility for protection, humanitarian intervention, territorial integrity, right to self-determination, etc. Their analysis in the light of the present security conditions will make it possible to develop a more effective security system and a smoother functioning of multilateralism.

Reflection on these issues should take place both at the UN and outside its framework so as to free the initiative from the rigid and formalised atmosphere that often prevails within the Organisation’s structures. The subject is politically sensitive and very extensive, and we, therefore, have opted to take an informal approach prior to submitting the initiative to the process of negotiations among member states. In our opinion, the initiative could be furthered in an unconventional way if it were acted upon by a group of independent figures. Its composition should reflect independence, high political and intellectual standards, and versatility in the international reality. This would offer an appropriate guarantee of moral and political dimension of the proceedings and the resulting final report, which could provide an inspiration for the member states. It is important that the group’s mandate and the manner in which its findings are presented to the UN be properly defined, and that, in the final stage, these findings be acted upon in practice. We regard our proposal as just one way leading to revitalisation of the Organisation, safeguarding its central position in the process of developing a multilateral, pluralistic system of global security.

New Dimensions of Security

Democratic stability and state security must rest on solid and extensive economic and civilisational foundations. Only in this way can state’s internal and external security and stability be realistically assured. Retaining national identity and civilisational vitality is largely contingent on our vigorous economic activity in the international arena. This will be greatly facilitated by Poland’s membership of the European Union, while participation in the Union’s development aid programmes will become a catalyst of Poland’s more pronounced presence on international markets.

In foreign economic policy the emphasis has been increasingly shifted towards adjustment to fast-evolving conditions and combination of bilateral and multilateral projects, whether political or economic. This path has been successfully followed by other developed countries. Therefore, foreign economic policy of Poland must take into account not only trade, but also investment and financial links—especially in respect of our region. Given the fact that general multilateral rules and commitments assumed within international organisations, such as the World Trade Organisations (WTO) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have increasingly gained in importance, Poland, as an effective member of the Union, will be able to bring pressure to bear on the line of change, and negotiate the best possible conditions for its economic development. This is of paramount importance for shaping this country’s foreign economic policy and ensuring the security of its citizens.

Poland’s foreign policy has gone through a process of change aimed at promoting its economy not only in the European Union area but, especially, on non-European markets. In this connection it is an important challenge for our foreign service to build durable economic links with our neighbours to the east, mainly Russia. Poland is aware of the direct interdependence between the expansion of economic and political contacts. Hence our efforts to build political contacts on the basis of stable economic co-operation.

The “economisation” of Polish foreign policy is reflected in growing direct involvement of the diplomatic and consular services in measures aimed at boosting exports, attracting foreign investors, promoting Polish economy internationally, and co-operating with foreign partners. This has been an increasingly important trend in the activity of the entire diplomatic service, albeit handicaped due to the continuing dual system of representation of Polish economic interests abroad.

It is to be regretted that the organisational changes in foreign economic service, introduced in 1999, failed to produce a transparent and effective system of external representation of Poland’s economic interests. The arrangement whereby economic and trade missions are not fully subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some missions are responsible only to the Ministry of the Economy is not conducive to effective economisation of Polish foreign policy and, consequently, effective representation of Polish economic interests abroad. As a result, Poland’s foreign economic relations are largely uncoupled from political relations. This stands in contrast with the practice followed by developed countries, including the United States and Germany, which have provided the model for systemic changes in Poland. It is Poland’s raison d’�tat that the wealth of our political contacts be translated into tangible economic achievements.

The contemporary world economy, which has assumed a global character, is more and more interdependent. Poland’s forthcoming membership of the EU requires that we prepare for new tasks to be performed under common economic policy within the Union and in relations with third parties. It has important consequences for the country’s foreign economic policy in addition to entailing new obligations and new challenges. And it also means the limitation of this policy’s autonomy (in favour of the EU’s common trade policy), changes in its instruments, and changes in the environment in which Polish businessmen operate at home and abroad.

Following Poland’s accession to the EU, the government’s foreign economic policy will undergo major changes. It will considerably gain in importance, because Poland will exert a meaningful influence on the foreign economic policy of the European Union. Thus the economisation of foreign policy must rank high on the list of government policy of adjustment to the challenges of forthcoming Union membership, challenges such as the capacity to utilise Union resources (structural funds) in major socio-economic projects. By assuming such responsibility, Poland should take a consistent stance and pursue a uniform policy overseen by a single decision-making centre. With a view to strengthening its position as a credible partner in the process of shaping the international environment, this country must build a strong economy. This is also a means of strengthening state security.

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A new world order is coming into view before our eyes—not without a certain measure of chaos and uncertainty. It has not been mapped out at any peace conference, nor has it been the subject of diplomatic negotiations. It emerges from an encounter of various forces, plans and visions, accompanied as they are by tensions and threats.

Poland derives its confidence from NATO membership and the forthcoming entry into the European Union. For a medium-sized country, anchoring in stable structures is the best safeguard for a time of change and turmoil. Yet we have not been relieved of the burden of choice and the attendant responsibility—if only because the European Union and NATO, those pillars of stability and continuity in Polish policy, are undergoing changes themselves. Hence the national raison d’�tat must always be present in our policy. It is rooted in a vision of an effective, internally strong state, a dynamically expanding economy, a stable legal and social order, in openness to the world and in allied loyalty.

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^* W�odzimierz Cimoszewicz, born 1950; graduate, Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Warsaw; doctor of law; grant holder of Fulbright Foundation (1980–1981) and Columbia University in New York; Sejm deputy from 1989; chairman of Democratic Left parliamentary caucus (1990–1993); deputy Sejm speaker and chair of National Assembly’s Constitutional Commission (1995–1996); deputy prime minister and minister of justice (1993–1995); prime minister (1996–1997); from 19 October 2001 minister of foreign affairs.